

How Foreign Criticism Hinders Attitudes towards Peace:

Evidence from Israel

Lotem Bassan-Nygate*

December 24, 2022

Abstract

Governments engaged in conflict are often named and shamed for their policies and actions. Existing literature has focused, for the most part, on the effects of shaming in the context of human rights and the environment. However, little is known about how foreign criticism shapes public attitudes towards peace in countries engaged in conflict. I argue that criticism directed towards conflict is interpreted through the lens of national identity – creating a ‘backlash’ effect – decreasing the public’s willingness to resolve the conflict while strengthening support for the condemned policies carried out by governments. Results from a survey experiment in Israel around the government’s plans to annex territories from the West Bank lend support to this theory. Overall, my findings show that foreign criticism decreased public support for peace while increasing support for annexation.

*Harvard Kennedy School, University of Wisconsin - Madison, lbassan@wisc.edu, lotembassanygate.com.

Countries engaged in conflict are often publicly criticized for their policies and actions. In 2021, twelve European states issued a joint statement condemning Israel's plans to greenlight thousands of new Israeli housing units in the West Bank (Carey and Gold 2021). In 2022, 143 countries supported a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia's attempts to annex regions in the Ukraine (Toosi and Heath 2022), and six countries including the U.S., Germany, and the U.K. issued a joint statement condemning Ethiopia and Eritrea's involvement in the Tigray conflict (State Department 2022). Does such foreign criticism shape conflict-related public attitudes in the target state?

A growing literature in international relations studies the impact of foreign criticism on public attitudes, with a focus on human rights (Davis, Murdie and Steinmetz 2012; Ausderan 2014) and environmental issues (Tingley and Tomz 2022; Koliev, Page and Tallberg 2022). However, while security issues make up almost a third of condemnations issued by governmental organizations (Squatrino, Lundgren and Sommerer 2019), we know little about the ways in which foreign criticism shapes attitudes towards peace and conflict.

Research suggests that foreign criticism can become counterproductive when political elites frame it as threatening to one's national identity, creating a 'rally around the flag' effect (Ayoub 2014; Snyder 2020; Tingley and Tomz 2022). In the context of conflict, I argue, shaming is often interpreted through the lens of national identity even in the absence of this elite cue because criticism deals directly with issues surrounding the state's sovereignty and legitimacy. As a result, shaming is hypothesized to have adverse consequences for conflict-related public preferences – increasing support for condemned policies that hinder peace.

To test this prediction I turn to Israel – a country entangled in an intractable conflict and engaged in military occupation, which is consequently one of the most publicly condemned

countries around the world (as demonstrated in Table A1). Results from a survey experiment around Israel’s attempts to annex large territories from the West Bank reveal that information on global criticism increased public support for annexation while decreasing support for negotiations with the Palestinians. I provide suggestive evidence for the mechanism driving this effect – increased levels of national identity – and for the external robustness of my findings.

Foreign criticism and conflict-related attitudes

Does foreign criticism shape attitudes towards peace? Recent evidence suggest that shaming can decrease domestic support for policies that violate human rights (Davis, Murdie and Steinmetz 2012; Koliev, Page and Tallberg 2022) or environmental agreements (Tingley and Tomz 2022). Foreign criticism may thus persuade domestic audiences that their governments’ transgressions in conflict – such as annexation of territories (Nichols 2022), mobilization of forces (Hunnicuttt and Chiacu 2022), or the use of excessive force (Perper 2018) – is wrong; violating rights, treaty commitments, or international norms. By convincing domestic audiences that their government’s policies are shameful, foreign criticism may increase support for resolving the conflict and seizing actions that hinder peace.

However, at the same time, research on shaming suggests that targeted governments can buy back domestic support by reframing foreign criticism as an attack on sovereignty (Bracic and Murdie 2020; Tingley and Tomz 2022). This government cue is effective because it enables political elites to frame foreign condemnations as a threat to national identity, creating a ‘rally around the flag’ effect (Wachman 2001; Ayoub 2014; Snyder 2020). While

this mechanism – increases in levels of national identity – remains largely a theoretical conjecture in the IR literature, a large body of work in social psychology finds that shaming often leads to a defensive reaction when it is perceived as threatening to one’s ingroup identity (Branscombe et al. 1999; Hornsey, Oppes and Svensson 2002; Hornsey and Imani 2004; Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek 2007; Ariyanto, Hornsey and Gallois 2010; Sharvit et al. 2015).

In the context of conflict, I argue, shaming can pose a threat to national identity even in the absence of a cue framing it as such. This is because foreign criticism often deals directly with issues surrounding the state’s legitimacy, sovereignty, or particular territories that hold national symbolic values (Shelef 2016; Manekin, Grossman and Mitts 2019). Take for instance the European Council’s labeling of Russia as a ‘terrorist state’ in its criticism of Russian aggression towards the Ukraine (Motyl 2022), or questions raised by Israel’s critics regarding its right to exist as a Jewish nation (Deutch 2022). These are examples of foreign critiques that raise questions regarding the target state’s legitimacy to exist in its current form. Criticism in the context of conflict, even if only directed towards a particular policy or behavior, may be interpreted through the lens of national identity and is thus likely to lead to defensiveness. We can therefore expect foreign criticism within this context to create a ‘backlash’ effect – decreasing public support for peace while increasing support for the condemned policies.

Observational survey data from Israel provides suggestive evidence for the ‘backlash’ effect to shaming in the context of conflict. In a survey conducted by the Israeli Democracy Institute in 2016 (IDI 2022), 58% of respondents said the Israeli government should not pay attention to international criticism around Israel’s policies in the West Bank. Respondents’

tendency to shrug off foreign shaming is further associated with decreased support for peace, even when controlling for a host of demographics including ideology (see Figure B1). However, while this association suggests that reactions to foreign criticism vary, and that they are correlated with attitudes towards peace, it does not account for the impact of shaming on conflict-related attitudes.

In fact, identifying the effect of foreign criticism on support for peace is challenging because conflict-related attitudes may be both a cause and an effect of shaming. While foreign criticism may decrease public support for peace in countries engaged in conflict, societies with hawkish citizens may simply be more likely to elect hawkish leaders whose policies invite more criticism in the first place. These inferential hurdles warrant an experimental approach, presented in the following sections.

Evidence from the proposed Israeli annexation of the West Bank

To examine the impact of foreign criticism on attitudes towards peace and conflict, I designed a survey experiment in Israel around the government's plans to annex territories from the West Bank. During the 2019 legislative elections campaign in Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to annex large parts of the occupied West Bank by July 1st 2020 (Holmes 2019). Although these plans were eventually shelved, and Netanyahu did not follow through on his vow, at the time there was ongoing media coverage in anticipation of annexation (Hendrix 2020) and individuals could not know this would be the outcome in advance. Overall, the media presented an ambiguous picture, in which it seemed likely, but not certain, that Israel will annex these territories (Holmes 2020). This ambiguity created

In the coming days, Israel is expected to annex territories from the West Bank. [Many governments publicly condemned Israel for this plan and said Israel should be ashamed of itself]

Figure 1: **Experimental vignette.** Treated respondents read the additional text marked in red providing information about foreign criticism of Israel.

a unique case, allowing me to design a realistic vignette around a hypothetical scenario. Condemnation of Israel in light of annexation seemed plausible, but criticism was yet to pile up as the plan slowly took shape. This allowed me to credibly shape perceptions of criticism amongst survey respondents, as evident from Table C4 of the appendix.

In the study, which was fielded in June 2020, I recruited 1,500 respondents, representative of the Jewish population in Israel based on gender, age, ethnicity, residence, and religiosity, using iPanel – Israel’s largest opt-in online survey company. The survey was programmed online using Qualtrics and presented to subjects in Hebrew. After completing several demographic questions and a series of measures about dispositional foreign policy characteristics (formerly utilized by Kertzer and Brutger (2016)), respondents were presented with a short vignette, which informed them that the government is expected to annex large parts of the West Bank in the coming days. Treated respondents were told that many governments criticized Israel for this policy and said that Israel should be ashamed of itself (see Figure 1), while controlled respondents were not presented with this additional information.

Two main outcome measures were collected after respondents were exposed to the vignette. First, respondents were asked whether they support or oppose annexation of territories from the West Bank. Responses ranged from ‘strongly oppose’ to ‘strongly support’, on a scale of 1 to 7, where higher values indicated more support for annexation. Second, subjects were asked how much they support or oppose peace negotiations with the Palestinian

authority, with responses ranging from ‘strongly support’ to ‘strongly oppose’, on a scale of 1 to 5.

I also included two questions about a potential mechanism driving my hypothesized effect – national identity – by asking respondents whether they are proud to be Israeli and whether they identify as Zionists (on a scale of 1 to 7). Similar to the American context (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Levendusky 2018), these two measures are highly correlated in the Israeli case (as suggested in Figure C2), and were thus indexed into one variable. Finally, respondents answered a manipulation check and two questions that gauge at potential confounders by asking whether respondents think Israel will face sanctions over annexation and whether they thought of a specific country when reading about international criticism.¹

Results

In Figure 2 I report the main results of the experiment. I estimate the average treatment effects (ATEs) of the shaming treatment on the two outcomes of interest – support for annexation, and support for peace negotiations (standardized to have a $\mu = 0$, and $\sigma = 1$). My results show that information on foreign criticism increased support for annexation from approximately 3.5 to 3.8 points on a 7 point scale. This effect is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) and equivalent to 19% of a standard deviation.

At the same time, information on foreign criticism decreased support for peace negotiations with the Palestinian authority from 3.2 to 3.1 points on a 5 point scale. This effect is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) and equivalent to 14% of a standard deviation. In Table C3 I show that all the results presented in Figure 2 remain statistically significant and

¹See Section C.6 for texts of these questions, and Sections C.3 and C.5 for an analysis.




Figure 2: **Treatment effect on main outcomes of interest.** The X-axis represents two outcomes of interest – support for annexation and support for peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. Outcomes were standardized ($\mu = 0, \sigma = 1$). Regression estimates are marked in red, robust standard errors in parentheses.

substantively similar when controlling for a host of pre-treatment demographics, including: sex, age, ethnicity, religiosity, ideology, and residence.

Taken together, these results suggest that foreign criticism created a ‘backlash’ effect amongst Israeli respondents, increasing support for the criticized policy and decreasing overall support for peace negotiations. My theoretical framework suggests that citizens rally around the flag in the face of such foreign criticism because it threatens their national identity. This implies that reactions to foreign criticism are mediated by increases in levels of national identity. To provide suggestive evidence for this mechanism, I conduct a mediation analysis in the appendix using Imai, Keele and Tingley’s (2010) mediation package. The results of the analyses are depicted in Figure C3, and demonstrate a positive and statistically significant average causal mediation effect (ACME) when nationalism is treated as

the mediator driving the effect of shaming on support for annexation, and a negative and statistically significant ACME when nationalism is treated as the mediator driving the effect of shaming on support for peace. However, since nationalism is not randomly assigned and the sequential ignorability assumption cannot be fully satisfied, this evidence is suggestive and calls for future research.

Finally, although Israel is a critical case for international criticism as one of the most criticized countries in the world (Table A1), it is also a unique one. In fact, it is possible that excessive criticism has made the Israeli public particularly sensitive to international criticism or created a general distrust towards the international community that is unique to Israel. To probe at external validity of my findings, I follow Devaux and Egami (2022) and estimate the external robustness of my results in the appendix (see section D). In doing so, I estimate how different a population should be from my experimental sample to explain away the target population average treatment effect (T-PATE). I find that the estimated robustness of my result is higher than Devaux and Egami’s proposed upper bound benchmark for moderate external robustness. This suggests that my findings have relatively high external robustness – estimated to be robust to populations that are relatively different from my experimental sample, even along theoretical confounders like international trust or hawkishness.

Conclusion

This research finds that information on foreign criticism in the context of conflict can create a backlash effect – increasing support for condemned government policies and decreasing overall support for peace. While past work suggests that when dealing with ‘softer’ issue

areas, foreign criticism becomes counterproductive only when framed as threatening to one's national identity, I argue that when dealing with matters of security, foreign criticism can be counterproductive even in the absence of such elite cues. As a result, shaming has adverse consequences for conflict-related public preferences.

To test this prediction I turn to Israel – perhaps one of the most condemned countries around the world, which is entangled in an ongoing conflict. I address the inferential hurdles associated with the confounded relationship between foreign criticism and public opinion by implementing an experiment around Israel's plans to annex territories from the West Bank. My findings reveal that information on global criticism increased public support for annexation while decreasing support for negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. I further provide suggestive evidence that this effect is driven in part by increased levels of national identity.

Not only does this research shed light on the understudied impact of shaming on conflict-related attitudes, it also has direct policy implications. Foreign actors often rely on shaming as a prevalent political strategy to shape public opinion and pressure governments engaged in conflict. However, my research suggests that these tactics can have unintended consequences, decreasing support for peace and increasing support for the condemned policies – ultimately providing transgressive governments with domestic leeway to engage in violations of international norms and laws.

Despite these contributions, however, this research faces certain limitations that motivate future research. First, although I provide a theoretical discussion and suggestive evidence regarding the mechanism driving my effect – national identity – my empirical analysis falls short of providing direct evidence regarding causal mechanisms. Future work should thus

adapt more rigorous designs, manipulating both treatments and mechanisms. Second, while Israel serves as a critical case for theories of foreign criticism and conflict, it is also a unique one. As such, learning about the impact of shaming in Israel has concrete policy implications, but also warrants replications in additional contexts. A test estimating the external robustness of my finding suggests that my identified effect is robust to populations that are relatively different from my experimental sample. However, future work should strive to implement similar designs in other countries engaged in conflict.

References

- Allendoerfer, Michelle Giacobbe, Amanda Murdie and Ryan M Welch. 2020. “The path of the boomerang: Human rights campaigns, third-party pressure, and human rights.” *International Studies Quarterly* 64(1):111–119.
- Ariyanto, Amarina, Matthew J Hornsey and Cindy Gallois. 2010. “United we stand: Intergroup conflict moderates the intergroup sensitivity effect.” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 40(1):169–177.
- Ausderan, Jacob. 2014. “How naming and shaming affects human rights perceptions in the shamed country.” *Journal of Peace Research* 51(1):81–95.
- Ayoub, Phillip M. 2014. “With arms wide shut: Threat perception, norm reception, and mobilized resistance to LGBT rights.” *Journal of Human Rights* 13(3):337–362.
- Bracic, Ana and Amanda Murdie. 2020. “Human rights abused? Terrorist labeling and individual reactions to call to action.” *Political Research Quarterly* 73(4):878–892.
- Branscombe, Nyla R, Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, Bertjan Doosje et al. 1999. “The context and content of social identity threat.” *Social identity: Context, commitment, content* pp. 35–58.
- Carey, Andrew and Hadas Gold. 2021. “Israeli settlement plans in the West Bank draw condemnation from US, UK, Europe.”
URL: <https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/28/middleeast/israel-west-bank-settlements-condemned-intl/index.html>
- Dafoe, Allan, Baobao Zhang and Devin Caughey. 2018. “Information equivalence in survey experiments.” *Political Analysis* 26(4):399–416.
- Davis, David R, Amanda Murdie and Coty Garnett Steinmetz. 2012. ““ Makers and Shapers”: Human Rights INGOs and Public Opinion.” *Hum. Rts. Q.* 34:199.
- Deutch, Gabby. 2022. “Israel shouldn’t exist as a Jewish state, Amnesty USA director tells Democratic group.”
URL: <https://jewishinsider.com/2022/03/israel-shouldnt-exist-as-a-jewish-state-amnesty-usa-director-tells-democratic-group>

- Devaux, Martin and Naoki Egami. 2022. “Quantifying Robustness to External Validity Bias.” *Available at SSRN 4213753* .
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2008. “Sticks and stones: Naming and shaming the human rights enforcement problem.” *International organization* 62(4):689–716.
- Hendrix, Steve. 2020. “Israel’s Netanyahu still working out West Bank annexation plans.”.
- Holmes, Oliver. 2019. “Netanyahu vows to annex large parts of occupied West Bank.”.
URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/10/netanyahu-vows-annex-large-parts-occupied-west-bank-trump>
- Holmes, Oliver. 2020. “What would Israel annexing the West Bank mean?: Uncertainty remains over when, how, or if Netanyahu will push for annexation.”.
URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/09/what-would-israel-annexing-the-west-bank-mean>
- Hornsey, Matthew J and Armin Imani. 2004. “Criticizing groups from the inside and the outside: An identity perspective on the intergroup sensitivity effect.” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 30(3):365–383.
- Hornsey, Matthew J, Tina Oppes and Alicia Svensson. 2002. ““It’s OK if we say it, but you can’t”: Responses to intergroup and intragroup criticism.” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 32(3):293–307.
- Huddy, Leonie and Nadia Khatib. 2007. “American patriotism, national identity, and political involvement.” *American journal of political science* 51(1):63–77.
- Hunnicut, Trevor and Doina Chiacu. 2022. “US’s Harris, Japan’s Kishida condemn China’s actions in Taiwan Strait.”.
URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-harris-japanese-leader-condemn-chinas-actions-taiwan-strait-statement-2022-09-26/>
- IDI. 2022. “Peace Index.”.
URL: <https://en.idi.org.il/centers/1159/1520>
- Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele and Dustin Tingley. 2010. “A general approach to causal mediation analysis.” *Psychological methods* 15(4):309.
- Kertzer, Joshua D and Ryan Brutger. 2016. “Decomposing audience costs: Bringing the audience back into audience cost theory.” *American Journal of Political Science* 60(1):234–249.
- Koliev, Faradj, Douglas Page and Jonas Tallberg. 2022. “The Domestic Impact of International Shaming: Evidence from Climate Change and Human Rights.” *Public opinion quarterly* 86(3):748–761.
- Lebovic, James H and Erik Voeten. 2006. “The politics of shame: the condemnation of country human rights practices in the UNCHR.” *International Studies Quarterly* 50(4):861–888.
- Levendusky, Matthew S. 2018. “Americans, not partisans: Can priming American national identity reduce affective polarization?” *The Journal of Politics* 80(1):59–70.
- Manekin, Devorah, Guy Grossman and Tamar Mitts. 2019. “Contested ground: Disentangling material and symbolic attachment to disputed territory.” *Political Science Research and Methods* 7(4):679–697.
- Motyl, Alexander J. 2022. “Is Russia a terrorist state?”.
URL: <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3750323-is-russia-a-terrorist-state/>
- Murdie, Amanda M and David R Davis. 2012. “Shaming and blaming: Using events data to assess the impact of human rights INGOs.” *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1):1–16.

- Nichols, Michelle. 2022. "United Nations condemns Russia's move to annex parts of Ukraine."
URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/united-nations-condemns-russias-move-annex-parts-ukraine-2022-10-12/>
- Perper, Rosie. 2018. "120 countries voted to condemn Israel for using 'excessive' force in Gaza clashes that killed over 100 people."
URL: <https://www.businessinsider.com/un-votes-condemn-israel-gaza-excessive-force-nikki-haley-2018-6>
- Ron, James, Howard Ramos and Kathleen Rodgers. 2005. "Transnational information politics: NGO human rights reporting, 1986–2000." *International Studies Quarterly* 49(3):557–587.
- Sharvit, Keren, Marco Brambilla, Maxim Babush and Francesco Paolo Colucci. 2015. "To feel or not to feel when my group harms others? The regulation of collective guilt as motivated reasoning." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 41(9):1223–1235.
- Shelef, Nadav G. 2016. "Unequal ground: Homelands and conflict." *International Organization* 70(1):33–63.
- Snyder, Jack. 2020. "Backlash against human rights shaming: emotions in groups." *International Theory* 12(1):109–132.
- Squatrito, Theresa, Magnus Lundgren and Thomas Sommerer. 2019. "Shaming by international organizations: Mapping condemnatory speech acts across 27 international organizations, 1980–2015." *Cooperation and Conflict* 54(3):356–377.
- State Department, U.S. 2022. "Joint Statement on Resumption of Hostilities in Northern Ethiopia."
URL: <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-resumption-of-hostilities-in-northern-ethiopia/>
- Tangney, June Price, Jeff Stuewig and Debra J Mashek. 2007. "Moral emotions and moral behavior." *Annual review of psychology* 58:345.
- Tingley, Dustin and Michael Tomz. 2022. "The effects of naming and shaming on public support for compliance with international agreements: an experimental analysis of the Paris Agreement." *International Organization* 76(2):445–468.
- Toosi, Nahal and Ryan Heath. 2022. "Strong majority of countries rebukes Russia at UN."
URL: <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/12/russia-ukraine-annexation-un-vote-00061558>
- Wachman, Alan M. 2001. "Does the diplomacy of shame promote human rights in China?" *Third World Quarterly* 22(2):257–281.

Supplementary Information
How Foreign Criticism Hinders Attitudes towards Peace?

Contents

A Case selection - Israel	SI-1
B Peace Index Survey	SI-2
C Annexation Experiment	SI-3
C.1 Descriptive Statistics	SI-3
C.2 Models with control variables	SI-4
C.3 Manipulation Check	SI-4
C.4 Mediation Analysis	SI-5
C.5 Exploring Confounding	SI-6
C.6 Survey Instrument (English)	SI-7
C.6.1 Pre-treatment covariates (order randomized)	SI-7
C.6.2 Treatment	SI-8
C.6.3 Outcomes	SI-8
C.6.4 Manipulation and placebos	SI-8
D Estimated External Robustness	SI-8

A Case selection - Israel

Israel is a country entangled in an intractable conflict and engaged in military occupation, and is consequently one of the most publicly condemned countries around the world. Table A1 summarizes Israel’s rank in cross national shaming datasets, demonstrating that it is often ranked as one of the 5 most criticized nations in the world. As a result, Israel serves as a critical case for my theory. Learning about the impact of foreign criticism in Israel has concrete policy implications for practitioners and can encourage alternative and more effective strategies to mobilize public opinion in countries engaged in conflict.

Rank	Percentage	Years covered	Shamer	Source
2 nd	3.99%	1986-2000	Amnesty International	Ron et al. (2005)
1 st	9.4%	1976-2000	UNCHR	Labovic & Voeten (2006)
1 st	3.99%	1972-2004	Amnesty International, Media, UNCHR	Hafner-Burton (2008)
4 th	4.31%	1993-2007	Human rights organizations	Murdie & Davis (2012)
1 st	29.47%	1980-2015	27 international organizations	Squatrito et al. (2019)
5 th	3.75%	1990-2009	Human rights organizations	Allendoerfer et al. (2020)

Table A1: Summary of Israel’s rank in past shaming datasets, demonstrating that it is one of the most criticized countries internationally. Percentage column refers to the proportion of shaming instances towards Israel out of the entire dataset.




Figure B1: Point estimates and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression models estimating the association between support for peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, attitudes towards foreign criticism, and a host of demographic controls. Coefficients in red are extracted from bivariate models, while coefficients in blue are extracted from multi-variate models, identifying the association between support for peace and specified variables in each model. Data is provided by the Israeli Democracy Institute’s peace index, and was collected on January 2016 (500 Jewish respondents).

B Peace Index Survey

In January 2016 the Israel Democracy Institute’s peace index (IDI 2022) included the following question: “Should Israel take the international community’s criticism towards its policies in the West Bank seriously?” Responses varied from ‘I’m certain it should not’ (1) to ‘I’m certain it should’ (5) ($\mu = 2.7, \sigma = 1.4$). 58% of respondents said Israel should not take criticism seriously. As demonstrated in Figure B1, these attitudes are correlated with decreased support for peace, measured as respondents’ answer to the question ‘How much do you support or oppose peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority’ (strongly oppose to strongly support), even when controlling for a host of demographics including ideology.

C Annexation Experiment
C.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table C2: Descriptive Statistics - Survey Experiment

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Support Annexation	1,521	3.630	1.727	1	7
Support Peace	1,507	3.145	0.941	1	5
Nationalism Index	1,503	6.148	1.147	1.000	7.000
Female	2,470	0.476	0.500	0	1
18-22	2,470	0.122	0.327	0	1
23-29	2,470	0.207	0.405	0	1
30-39	2,470	0.268	0.443	0	1
40-49	2,470	0.180	0.384	0	1
50-70	2,470	0.224	0.417	0	1
Ashkenazi	2,402	0.368	0.482	0	1
Mizrahi	2,402	0.360	0.480	0	1
Russian	2,402	0.178	0.382	0	1
Ethiopian	2,402	0.090	0.287	0	1
Other ethnicity	2,402	0.005	0.068	0	1
Secular	1,850	0.561	0.496	0	1
Traditional	1,850	0.279	0.449	0	1
Religious	1,850	0.128	0.334	0	1
Haredi	1,850	0.032	0.177	0	1
Jerusalem	1,850	0.106	0.308	0	1
Tel Aviv	1,850	0.322	0.467	0	1
North	1,850	0.279	0.449	0	1
South	1,850	0.202	0.402	0	1
Sharon	1,850	0.090	0.287	0	1
Right	1,538	0.562	0.496	0	1
Center	1,538	0.256	0.437	0	1
Left	1,538	0.181	0.385	0	1
Militant Assertiveness	1,527	5.039	1.178	1.000	7.000
International Trust	1,527	3.397	1.470	1	7




Figure C2: Correlation between two measures of national identity (patriotism and Zionism).

C.2 Models with control variables

Table C3: Main Models with and without (pre-treatment) Demographic Controls

	Support Annexation		Support Peace Negotiations	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.191*** (0.051)	0.145*** (0.047)	-0.141*** (0.051)	-0.115** (0.049)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
<i>N</i>	1,521	1,521	1,507	1,507

Notes: Outcomes standardize to have mean of 0 and SD of 1. Demographic controls include: sex, age, ethnicity, religiosity, ideology, and residence. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

C.3 Manipulation Check

In this section I test whether I was able to successfully manipulate information regarding foreign criticism of Israel. The shaming treatment increased the belief that Israel was criticized for its plans to annex territories from the West Bank. This effect is equivalent to 14% of a standard deviation and is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$, even when including a host of demographic controls, as evident from Table C4.

Table C4: Manipulation Check

Belief Israel was criticized over annexation		
	(1)	(2)
Treatment	0.074*** (0.026)	0.076*** (0.026)
Controls	No	Yes
<i>N</i>	1,501	1,501

Notes: Demographic controls include: sex, age, ethnicity, religiosity, ideology, and residence. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

C.4 Mediation Analysis

As described in the main text, I conduct a mediation analysis using [Imai, Keele and Tingley \(2010\)](#) mediation package. In [Figure C3](#) I report the results of these analyses. The analysis considers nationalism as a mediator driving the effect of my shaming treatment on the two outcomes of interest – support for annexation (right) and support for peace (left). I find that the ACME, direct effect and total effect are positive and statistically significant when the outcome is support for annexation, suggesting that respondents with increased national attachments were more likely to support annexation. At the same time, the ACME, direct effect, and total effect were negative and statistically significant when the outcome is support for peace, suggesting that subjects with increased levels of nationalism were less likely to support peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.




Figure C3: **Causal mediation plots.** Treatment is shaming manipulation, Mediator is nationalism (post-treatment), In the figure on the left, outcome is support for peace. In the figure on the right, outcome is support for annexation. Horizontal lines represent 90% confidence intervals for estimates.

C.5 Exploring Confounding

I employ two questions to address concerns relating to information leakage (Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey 2018). First, I test whether respondents in my shaming condition were more likely to believe that Israel will face sanctions over annexation. If I were to find a statistically significant effect, this may suggest that it is not information on shaming per se that impacted my outcomes of interest, but rather leakage on information on sanctions. However, Table C5 suggests that the association between beliefs about sanctions and my treatment is null.

Table C5: Information Leakage (Sanctions)

	Belief Israel will face sanctions over Annexation	
	(1)	(2)
Treatment	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.018 (0.022)
Controls	No	Yes
<i>N</i>	1,496	1,496

Notes: Outcomes standardize to have mean of 0 and SD of 1. Covariate controls include: sex, age, ethnicity, religiosity, ideology, residence, militant assetiveness, and international trust. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

A second concern is that respondents in the shaming condition thought of a particular country when reading the vignette. While this concern does not pose any particular threats to inference, it



Figure C4: Wordcloud of the countries respondents thought of when reading the vignette (note that only 27% mentioned that they thought of a specific country).

may have consequences for the scope of the theory. That is, if shaming is only associated with one country (or group of countries), effects may vary when foreign criticism is administered by other countries. To gauge at this concern, I asked respondents whether they thought of a specific country when reading the vignette. First, only 27% of respondents said they thought of a specific country. Of those, it appears that responses vary, where most respondents thought of European countries like Germany and France, but others have also mentioned the U.S. as well as adversaries like Arab countries and Iran.

C.6 Survey Instrument (English)

C.6.1 Pre-treatment covariates (order randomized)

1. What is your gender? [men/women]
2. What is your age? [18-22/23-29/30-39/40-49/50-70]
3. What is your ethnicity? [Ashkenazi/Mizrahi/Mixed/Russian or former USSR/Ethiopian/Other]
4. How do you define yourself? [Secular/Traditional/Religious/Haredi]
5. Where do you reside? [Jerusalem area (02 area code)/ Tel Aviv or center area (03 area code)/ Haifa or the North area (04 area code)/ the South area (08 area code)/ the Sharon area (09 area code)]
6. People often talk about politics in Israel in terms of right and left wing. Please place yourself on a scale of 1 (right) to 7 (left) with respect to politics in Israel [1-7]
7. The best way to ensure peace is through the IDF's strength [strongly agree-strongly disagree, 1-7]
8. The use of military force only makes problems worse [strongly agree-strongly disagree, 1-7]
9. Going to war is unfortunate, but sometimes its the only solution [strongly agree-strongly disagree, 1-7]²
10. Generally speaking, Israel can trust other nations [strongly agree-strongly disagree, 1-7]

²Items 7-9 are indexed into one 'militant assertiveness' variable.

C.6.2 Treatment

Please read the following text carefully and then answer the questions that follow:

In the coming days, Israel is expected to annex territories from the West Bank. [Many governments publicly condemned Israel for this plan and said Israel should be ashamed of itself].

C.6.3 Outcomes

- How much do you support or oppose the government’s plans to annex large territories from the West Bank? [Strongly support/Support/Somewhat support/ Neither support or oppose/ Somewhat oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
- How much do you support or oppose peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authorities [Strongly support/Somewhat support/ Neither support or oppose/ Somewhat oppose/ Strongly oppose]
- Please mark how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: [Strongly agree/Agree/Somewhat agree/ Neither agree or disagree/ Somewhat disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree]
 - I am proud to be Israeli
 - I am a Zionist

C.6.4 Manipulation and placebos

- Did countries around the world criticize Israel for its plans to annex large territories from the West Bank? [yes/no/I don’t know]
- Do you think Israel will face sanctions as a result of annexing large territories from the West Bank? [yes/no/I don’t know]
- When reading the vignette, did you think of specific countries? [yes/no]
 - (if yes:) Please specify which countries: [open end]

D Estimated External Robustness

In this section I follow [Devaux and Egami \(2022\)](#) and test the estimated external robustness of my findings. In doing so, I estimate how different a population should be from my experimental sample to explain away the target population average treatment effect (T-PATE). Figure [D5](#) shows the estimated external robustness and the distribution of estimated CATEs. The estimated external robustness is 0.61, which is greater than [Devaux and Egami’s](#) proposed upper bound benchmark for moderate external robustness (0.57). This implies that the target population average treatment effect (T-PATE) estimate is robust to populations that are relatively different from the experimental sample. As a comparison, the causal estimates in my experiment will be equal to zero only when the experimental sample is as different from a hypothetical population as MTurk samples are from the U.S. general population.

To substantively understand how far my experimental results can be generalized, I also report the means of covariates in the closest population for which the T-PATE is equal to zero. Table [D6](#) demonstrates that T-PATE is no longer positive in populations that are relatively different from the experimental sample. Causal effects are robust to changes in many variables for about 0.2–0.9 standard deviations. However, causal effects are robust to changes in certain ethnicities and religious




Figure D5: External Robustness and Distribution of Estimated CATEs. The estimated robustness is 0.57.

minorities in Israel (like ultra-Orthodox Jews) by less than 0.1 standard deviations. While this implies that my findings may not generalize to these populations in Israel (which are relatively under represented in my sample, and in the general society), I believe this to be largely inconsequential to external validity to contexts outside of Israel. When considering potential theoretical moderators like militant assertiveness and international trust, we learn that causal effects are robust to changes as high as 0.89 standard deviations.

	Experimental Sample	Population with T-PATE = 0	Standardized Difference
Female	0.51 (0.5)	0.66 (0.48)	-0.29
Age	3.38 (1.39)	4.04 (1.2)	-0.48
Ashkenazi	0.37 (0.48)	0.7 (0.46)	-0.67
Mizrahi	0.38 (0.49)	0.16 (0.36)	0.45
Russian	0.18 (0.38)	0.11 (0.32)	0.17
Ethiopian	0.07 (0.25)	0.03 (0.17)	0.14
Other ethnicity	0 (0.06)	0 (0.03)	0.05
Secular	0.53 (0.5)	0.74 (0.44)	-0.43
Traditional	0.3 (0.46)	0.18 (0.38)	0.27
Religious	0.14 (0.34)	0.06 (0.23)	0.23
Haredi	0.03 (0.17)	0.02 (0.13)	0.07
Right	0.57 (0.5)	0.23 (0.42)	0.69
Center	0.26 (0.44)	0.48 (0.5)	-0.51
Left	0.18 (0.38)	0.3 (0.46)	-0.32
Militant assertiveness	5.06 (1.16)	4.03 (1.16)	0.89
International Trust	3.39 (1.46)	3.85 (1.33)	-0.32

Table D6: Means of covariates in the experimental sample and the closest population whose T-PATE is equal to zero.